Briefly recall in your write -up the events leading to the two shuttle disasters. The primary O-ring of the left nozzle had been eroded so extensively that it had failed to seal, and for the first time hot gases had eroded the secondary O-ring.
It was much lower than the air temperature and far below the design specifications for the O-rings. While extrusion was taking place, hot gases leaked past a process called "blow-by"damaging the O-rings until a seal was made.
This was believed to be the result of supercooled air blowing on the joint from the liquid oxygen LOX tank vent. The O-rings, as well as many other critical components, had no test data to support any expectation of a successful launch in such conditions. In the post-flight analysis, Thiokol engineers found that the amount of blow-by was relatively small and had not impinged upon the secondary O-ring, and concluded that for future flights, the damage was an acceptable risk.
Attached Chapter 12, The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disasters Students will read the case found in Chapter 12 and prepare a page response to the following questions: The change that the firm seeks to achieve lies in the future of the enterprise and this is where there is an analysis of the issues that the business is likely to face and the strategies of the management of change.
After the destruction of Challenger, the number of O-rings per field joint was increased to three.
Aldrich decided to postpone the shuttle launch by an hour to give the Ice Team time to perform another inspection. However, after the Challenger disaster, Thiokol engineer Brian Russell identified this event as the first "big red flag" regarding O-ring safety.
This was an important consideration, since the SRB O-rings had been designated as a "Criticality 1" component, meaning that there was no backup if both the primary and secondary O-rings failed, and their failure could destroy the Orbiter and kill its crew.
This was unproven, and was in any case an argument that did not apply to a "Criticality 1" component. Ice had accumulated all over the launch pad, raising concerns that ice could damage the shuttle upon lift-off. They did not call for a halt to shuttle flights until the joints could be redesigned, but rather treated the problem as an acceptable flight risk.
January Learn how and when to remove this template message Gray smoke escaping from the right side SRB The following account of the accident is derived from real time telemetry data and photographic analysis, as well as from transcripts of air-to-ground and mission control voice communications.
On reentry, the breach allowed superheated gas into the wing, which, as a result melted in critical areas. Aluminum oxides from the burned solid propellant sealed the damaged joint, temporarily replacing the O-ring seal before flame passed through the joint.
Above the glass transition temperature, the O-rings display properties of elasticity and flexibility, while below the glass transition temperature, they become rigid and brittle.
The secondary O-ring was not in its seated position due to the metal bending. The Shuttle was never certified to operate in temperatures that low.
On the morning of the disaster, the primary O-ring had become so hard due to the cold that it could not seal in time. The temperature had dropped below the glass transition temperature of the O-rings.
Although the Ice Team had worked through the night removing ice, engineers at Rockwell still expressed concern. The redesigned SRB field joint used subsequent to the Challenger accident used an additional interlocking mortise and tang with a third O-ring, mitigating blow-by.
Predictions of unacceptable weather at KSC on January 26, caused the launch to be rescheduled for NASA Shuttle Case Study Introduction For this assignment we will discuss some theories on organizational change learned during this class and how they relate to the case study of NASA (The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disaster).
Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster Background The main fuel tanks are usually covered in foam as an insulator to prevent ice from forming when the tank is full of liquid hydrogen and oxygen.
Challenger also presented a case study in organizational communication and ethics, including the ethics of organizational structure and culture as it promotes or discourages necessary communication, the ethics of whistle blowing, and an excellent study of group The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.
Space Shuttle Case Studies: Challenger and Columbia. and the details of the Challenger and Columbia disasters are worthy of discussion as they relate to a variety of sub-disciplines, including. Use as case study. The Challenger accident has frequently been used as a case study (Huntsville has also named new schools posthumously in memory of each of the Apollo 1 astronauts and the final Space Shuttle Columbia and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.
Up to that point, no one directly involved in the. Case Study: (Attached) Chapter 12, The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disasters Students will read the case found in Chapter 12 and prepare a page response to the following questions: 1.
Discuss the changes that NASA.Download